Algerian national media: freedom at a cost by El-Issawi, F







About the Middle East Centre
The Middle East Centre builds on LSE’s 
long engagement with the Middle East and 
provides a central hub for the wide range of 
research on the region carried out at LSE.
The Middle East Centre aims to enhance 
understanding and develop rigorous 
research on the societies, economies, poli-
ties and international relations of the region. 
The Centre promotes both specialised 
knowledge and public understanding of this 
crucial area and has outstanding strengths 
in interdisciplinary research and in regional 
expertise. As one of the world’s leading 
social science institutions, LSE comprises 
departments covering all branches of the 
social sciences. The Middle East Centre 
harnesses this expertise to promote innova-
tive research and training on the region.
Publications Editor 




Cosmetiques and Tabac, Algeria 2015 
© Anita Hammadache Photography  
http://www.anitahammadache.com
Middle East Centre 
London School of Economics  
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE 
blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec | @LSEmiddleeast
lse.ac.uk/middleeastcentre
Algerian National Media: Freedom at a Cost
Fatima el-Issawi
LSE Middle East Centre Report
February 2017
About the Author
Dr Fatima el-Issawi is Assistant Professo-
rial Research Fellow at the LSE Middle 
East Centre and Senior Lecturer in Jour-
nalism at the University of  Essex. Her 
book, Arab National Media and Political 
Change, published by Palgrave in 2016, 
dissects dynamics of  change and confor-
mity in traditional newsrooms post-Arab 
uprisings. Fatima has over 15 years of 
experience in covering the Middle East 
for international media such as Agence 
France Presse (AFP) and BBC Arabic Ser-
vice. She is also media commentator and 
media consultant for several media devel-
opment and international agencies. 
Abstract
This report on Algerian national media 
and political change is part of  the ‘Arab 
National Media and Politics: Democracy 
Revisited’ project, examining the rela-
tionship between Arab traditional mass 
media and the political sphere within the 
broad subject area of  political change 
in the Arab world.  Based on a series of 
around 30 in-depth qualitative interviews 
conducted with journalists and media 
stakeholders in Algeria, as well as analysis 
of  media regulation and individual case 
studies, this report looks at the role played 
by national media – radio, television and 
print – in widening, or restricting, public 
debate under a competitive authoritarian 
system. 
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Si tu parles, tu meurs,
Si tu te tais, tu meurs,
Alors parle et meurs.1  
Introduction 
The Algerian media landscape, while exhibiting some of  the structural features of  the 
industry in neighbouring North African countries, is unique in tending to employ a bolder 
tone and showing comparatively greater resistance to pressure. It is empowered by a long 
history of  braving taboos, including enduring retaliations by extremist Islamist groups 
during the dark decade of  the Civil War. 
However, Algerian national media has missed an opportunity for development. During 
the Civil War, it was reduced to a ‘patriotic’ platform for the regime’s messages and con-
sistent attacks by rebels. Today, independent reporting is curtailed by a combination of 
formal and informal pressures. Media content is restricted by vague legal stipulations, 
including normative obligations to play a ‘national role’ in support of  the state. The pre-
carious situation of  the private broadcast sector, which is tolerated without being licensed, 
increases its instrumentalisation, and it now heavily invests in sensational reporting, oper-
ating at the margins of  international standards.
The Algerian media landscape represents multi-layered struggles and divides: linguistic, 
cultural, generational and ideological. It is a case study of  excessive state intervention 
in the shaping of  media content, operations and economic viability, especially by use of 
commercial pressure.2 The recent move towards the institutionalisation of  media rights 
and freedoms is largely state-controlled and is seen as suspicious by a large part of  the 
media community. Algeria’s new media law falls short of  meeting international standards 
for freedom of  expression. 
This report on Algerian national media and political change is part of  the ‘Arab National 
Media and Politics: Democracy Revisited’ project, examining the relationship between 
Arab traditional mass media and the political sphere within the broad subject area of 
political change in the Arab world.3 Based on a series of  around 30 in-depth qualitative 
1 [If  you speak, you die. If  you are silent, you die. So speak out, and die.] Saying by Tahar Djaout, lead-
ing Algerian journalist assassinated in 1993.
2  For media ownership see: Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock and Helena Sousa (eds), Media Ownership, 
Concentration, and Control The Evolution of  Debate (UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011); Steven Barnett and Judith 
Townend (eds), Media Power and Plurality (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015); Gillian Doyle, Media Ownership: 
Concentration, Convergence and Public Policy: The Economics and Politics of  Convergence and Concentration in the UK 
and European Media (London: Sage, 2002).
3  For a discussion on media systems, media and democratisation, see: Diamond Larry, ‘Rethinking Civil 
Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation’, Journal of  Democracy 5/3 (1994), pp. 4–17; T. Carothers, 
‘The End of  the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of  Democracy 13/1 (2002), pp. 1–21; D. C. Hallin & P. 
Mancini, Comparing media systems: Three models of  media and politics (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004).
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interviews conducted with journalists and media stakeholders in September 2016, as 
well as analysis of  media regulation and individual case studies, this report looks at the 
role played by national media – radio, television and print – in widening, or restricting, 
public debate under a competitive authoritarian system.4 The report especially examines 
the impact of  state intervention in the media sector and its implications on indepen-
dent reporting, taking into consideration the unique journey of  a media industry trapped 
between extremism, authoritarianism, and political and ideological polarisation.
Key Findings
• Sustained state interference in shaping the national media sector and its economic 
prospects is preventing the institutionalisation of  genuine media pluralism. Opening 
the broadcast sector to private ownership is only providing a façade of  pluralism, 
while consolidating the homogeneity of  media content and structures. 
• The regime’s use of  the private broadcast sector as a platform for political messaging 
with no independent regulatory framework is reinforcing the uniformity of  content and 
strengthening control by enforcing normative ‘national’ obligations of  positive reporting.
• State monopoly over public advertising is a powerful tool for undermining the eco-
nomic viability of  the critical press. Pressure on private advertisers to withdraw their 
financial support of  critical media is alarming.
• The progress of  media reform towards the institutionalisation of  media rights and 
freedoms is positive. However, there are many exceptions imposed on these rights in 
vaguely worded legal articles.
• The sustained use of  judicial pursuits against journalists and media organisations is 
draining financial resources and delegitimising the critical press, thus acting as a power-
ful deterrent against any expression of  dissent. Frequent imprisonment cases related to 
expression of  dissent on social media is in contradiction with the new constitution that 
abolished prison sentences for journalists and acknowledged freedom of  expression. 
• Lack of  access to official information is a powerful barrier against independent re-
porting. The entrenched habits of  self-censorship by journalists – under the guise of 
protecting the stability of  the country – are further empowered by the lack of  practi-
cal means to access information. 
• National Algerian media is yet to respond to challenges posed by recent developments 
in the media industry and to invest in adequate professional training for journalists, 
especially the youth. The entrenched traditions of  opinion journalism are surviving 
alongside the thriving populist trends championed by the new media, which is largely 
loyal to the regime and consolidates lapdog journalism. A debate about the definition of 
professional standards is as important as the reform of  journalistic bodies responsible 
4  For analysis on the public sphere and its limitations, see: Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation 
of  the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); Craig J. Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere 
(Cambridge: MIT Press: 1992); Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks (eds.), Communication and Citizenship: 
Journalism and the Public Sphere in the New Media Age (London: Sage, 1992). 
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for protecting journalists’ rights. Algerian journalists need to regain the trust and re-
spect of  audiences, because their legitimacy is currently at stake.  
• Independent national media is besieged by a combination of  regulatory, judicial and 
financial restrictions that make its future uncertain. The increase of  pressure on criti-
cal media after President Bouteflika’s election for his fourth term questions the genu-
ine will of  the government to implement efficient and inclusive media reform.
The Algerian Spring and the Effects of Civil War 
When you ask Algerians about the wave of  political uprisings that swamped the Arab 
world from 2010, a common answer is: ‘We already had our Spring’. The popular riots 
of  5 October 1988 paved the way to the introduction of  a multi-party political system 
and the fall of  state monopoly over the national press.5 Constitutional reforms were intro-
duced and approved in a referendum organised in February 1989. The advent of  the 
so-called independent press between 1990 and 1992 is viewed as the ‘Golden Age’ of  the 
Algerian press. Newly launched print publications introduced a new diversity of  content 
away from the uniform state media narratives. 
A military coup aimed at preventing the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from winning the 
second round of  elections in January 1992 plunged the country into turmoil, leading to 
a brutal civil war between Algerian security forces and extremist Islamist factions.6 The 
so-called ‘dirty war’ lasted a decade, leaving 200,000 Algerians dead and approximately 
15,000 forcibly disappeared, including journalists, effectively halting the process of  media 
reform. The Civil War ended with the adoption of  an amnesty law (Concorde Civile) in 
1999, followed by the so-called Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (Chartre 
pour la Paix et la Reconciliation Nationale) in 2005. The process was contested as failing 
to bring justice to the victims of  terrorism.
At the time of  the 2011 Algerian protests, tens of  thousands of  demonstrators took to the 
streets, protesting against high food prices and unemployment. However, their numbers 
were too small to have an impact on mainstream politics. The country’s ability as a major 
oil and gas producer to increase public spending on subsidies, social housing and public 
sector wages, was one factor that helped limit the protests.7 But the lack of  large-scale pop-
ular engagement was indicative of  a general rejection of  radical political change among 
Algerians, whose cost could be renewed infighting. The collective memory of  the Civil 
War had formed a psychological barrier. Bouteflika’s election for a fourth term in April 
2014 despite his frail health, following a constitutional amendment in 2008 removing 
5  The violent events led to around 500 deaths and thousands of  arrests. See: Benjamin Stora, ‘Algerie, 
le Seisme d’Octobre 1988’, Liberation, 10 October 2008. Available at: http://www.liberation.fr/plan-
ete/2008/10/10/algerie-le-seisme-d-octobre-1988_114109.
6  Luis Martinez, ‘The Algerian Civil War: 1990–1998’, Comparative Politics and International Studies (London: 
Hurst, 2002); Jonathan C. Hill, Democratisation in the Maghreb (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016).
7  Mohsin Khan and Karim Mezran, ‘No Arab Spring for Algeria’, The Atlantic Council, 29 May 2014. 
Available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/no-arab-spring-for-algeria.
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restrictions on presidential term limits, can be considered a vote for the status-quo.8 Mean-
while, human rights and freedom of  expression continued to worsen. According to Freedom 
House ratings for 2015, Algeria declined from Partly Free to Not Free due to restrictions 
placed on the media during and immediately after the 2014 presidential election.9
Limits to Progress 
Following the country’s independence in 1962, the ruling National Liberation Front (Front 
de Libération Nationale, FLN), imposed a monopoly on the national press, limiting it to 
one daily French language (El Mujahid) and another published in Arabic (El Shaeb),10 along-
side a few periodicals. The constitution of  1976 stated that freedom of  expression should 
be exercised ‘within the framework of  socialist principles’,11 which in practice banned all 
expression perceived to be against these ideals. 
State monopoly over the national press was abolished alongside the introduction of  politi-
cal pluralism in 1988. The new constitution of  1989 acknowledged fundamental freedoms 
and rights, such as freedom of  expression and association.12 In line with this newly intro-
duced political diversity, and in an attempt to reduce the scope and financial cost of  the 
state-owned press,13 the new Information Code of  1990 (Article 11) granted professional 
journalists of  the state press the right to own publications – up to a third of  the publi-
cation’s shares – on the condition that they organise themselves into collective editorial 
boards.14 These new projects benefited from strong state support, such as payment of 
salaries for three years, low rent and low-cost printing in the state-owned printing houses.15 
The creation of  the Information Code of  2012 (Article 12-05)16 was another major develop-
ment, since it ended state monopoly over broadcast media, which had been exercised since 
the country’s independence. However, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 
at least 32 of  the law’s 133 articles can be used to restrict independent reporting, imposing 
undue restrictions on access to information, as well as heavy fines for violations of  the law.17 
8  Richard Javad Heydarian, ‘Algerian Elections: The End of  the Arab Spring?’, The Huffington Post, 
18 April 2014. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-javad-heydarian/algerian-elec-
tions-the-en_b_5174754.html; Mélanie Matarese, ‘5 questions sur l’élection présidentielle algérienne’, 
Le Figaro, 23 March 2014. Available at: http://blog.lefigaro.fr/algerie/2014/03/5-questions-sur-llec-
tion-presidentielle-algerienne.html.
9  See: Freedom House report. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/algeria
10  The two dailies are still published to date, although with very low distribution. 
11  See: the 1976 Constitution. Available at: http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/africa/
Algeria/Constitution%20Algeria%201976.pdf. 
12  Article 39 of  the 1989 Constitution. Available at: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.dz/Constitu-
ion89_2.htm#s3.
13  See an article by the pan-Arab newspaper Al Hayat on the complex relationship between the national 
press and the Algerian regime. Available at: http://bit.ly/2k2jd6U
14  Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne 14, 4 Avril 1990. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/
docs/ELECTRONIC/9961/77638/F1547031388/DZA-9961.pdf
15  Ibid.
16  La loi organique n° 12-05 du 18 Safar 1433 correspondant au 12 Janvier 2012. The law covers the publica-
tion of  ideas ‘by any written, sound, television or electronic support’. 
17  ‘In Algeria, new media law stifles free expression’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 25 January 2014. 
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The Audiovisual Code of  2014 opened the sector to private authorised Algerian insti-
tutions.18 However, private broadcast media was limited to thematic programmes and 
obliged to disseminate ‘messages of  general interest for the public authorities and offi-
cial statements aiming to maintain the public order’. In addition, conditions imposed on 
media ownership were strict19 and the government declared the non-availability of  free 
frequencies on FM waves.20 
The Audiovisual Regulatory Authority (Autorité de Régulation de L’Audiovisual, ARAV) 
was instituted in 2016 to oversee the broadcast sector – both private and state-owned 
– by ensuring the ‘free exercise of  the audiovisual activity according to the conditions 
defined by law’. Its power extends to all broadcasting platforms – terrestrial, cable and 
satellite21 – and includes regulation (giving permission to use TV frequencies), control 
(ensuring adherence to all regulations) and advice (on all related laws). It also acts as an 
arbiter in resolving litigations.22 This new entity is formed of  nine members nominated by 
presidential decree. With the system of  nomination of  members largely controlled by the 
President, and the lack of  clear criteria in defining requirements for these posts, doubt can 
be cast on its ability to act independently away from governmental oversight.23 
While Article 50 in the new constitution of  2016 consecrated freedom of  the press, it 
also states that media freedom should be exercised ‘under the law and with respect of  the 
religious, moral and cultural constants and values of  the nation’. Article 51, on the other 
hand, declared the right to access information and to disseminate it. However, this right 
remains limited, excluding ‘the private life, persons’ rights, legitimate interests of  enter-
prises and the requirements of  the national security’.24 
While recent efforts towards media institutionalisation present a positive move, there are 
many exceptions especially when it comes to practical implementation.25 Prison sentences 
for journalists for offences related to their profession were abolished in the new consti-
tution, but the frequency of  legal cases brought against journalists, institutions or social 
media users based on defamation pursuant to the Penal Code is a powerful deterrent 
Available at: https://cpj.org/2012/01/in-algeria-new-media-law-stifles-free-expression.php.
18  Loi n° 14-04 du 24 février 2014 relative à l’activité audiovisuelle [Law 14-04], March 2014. Available at: 
http://www.ministerecommunication.gov.dz/fr/node/356.
19  Jose Alberto Azeredo, ‘Assessment of  media legislation in Algeria’, MEDMEDIA, 2015. Available at: 
http://www.med-media.eu/library/assessment-of-media-legislation-in-algeria.
20  ‘Lancement de chaînes de radio privées: Messahel affirme la non disponibilité d’espace libre dans 
la modulation de fréquence’, Djazairess, 7 January 2014. Available at: http://www.djazairess.com/fr/
apsfr/339546.
21  See the website of  the new regulatory body: http://www.arav.dz/fr/.
22  See the webpage detailing the mission of  the new body: http://www.arav.dz/fr/2-non-categorise/26-
missions-de-l%E2%80%99arav.
23  The first nomination by presidential decree of  the new authority’s members took place on 19 June 
2016.
24  République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Constitution de la République Algérienne Démocratique et 
Populaire [The Algerian Constitution], p.7. Available at: http://www.joradp.dz/TRV/Fcons.pdf.
25  See: Freedom House Report on Algeria, 2015. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/free-
dom-press/2015/algeria.
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against dissent, especially because it can lead to prison sentences in practice.26  
National Media and the Special Conditions 
Publications that emerged during the ‘Golden Age’ of  1990–92 helped the press gain a 
reputation of  being ‘serious’ and ‘quality’. The most prominent among these publications 
are the French language El Watan, Liberté and Le Quotidien d’Oran, with leftist secularist 
tendencies, and the Arabic language El Khabar, which presents itself  as a news-focused, 
independent publication with no political affiliation.
These publications have faced competition in recent years from newly launched newspa-
pers. The most notable of  those, Echourouk and Ennahar, which score the highest in terms 
of  distribution, are owned and managed by former journalists who are allegedly close to 
the regime and benefit from its financial support. In contrast to the sober tone and content 
of  the so-called ‘quality’ press, these new publications compete over the sensational.27 
The state audiovisual apparatus is limited to one institution, the Entreprise Nationale de 
Télévision Algérienne (ENTV), established in 1986, which manages five channels and 
four regional TV stations. The state also monopolises radio frequencies. The Etablisse-
ment Public de Radio Diffusion Sonore (EPRS) manages seven national radio stations 
and 48 regional radio stations.
The outbreak of  the private audiovisual sector led to the flourishing of  a multitude of  tol-
erated – yet unlicensed – television channels post-2012.28 These TV stations, broadcasting 
from inside the country with large operations and staff, operate in total regulatory limbo, 
registered as foreign media institutions. Only five have gained a temporary one-year 
authorisation from the Algerian authorities, which can be revoked at any time and requires 
continuous renewal. They allegedly adopt a news agenda favourable to the regime, or 
some currents within it. Indeed, the advent of  private channels was first encouraged by the 
regime during a diplomatic crisis with Egypt over a soccer match, in which the Algerian 
winning team was subjected to violent attacks by Egyptian fans and media, leading to a 
political crisis between the two countries.29     
26   Prison sentences can be imposed according to articles of  the Penal Code: Article 144 imposes prison 
sentences – 2 months to 2 years – against ‘anyone who intends to infringe the honour, delicacy and 
respect due to their authority, […]of  a magistrate, a civil servant, a public officer, a commanding officer 
or a law enforcement officer’; Article 144 imposes prison sentences – from 3 to 5 years – for ‘offences 
against the Prophet’ and Article 146 imposes prison sentences or fines for offences against public insti-
tutions.    
27  Ministère de la Communication, ‘Pluralisme, Professionalisme, Crédibilite’ [Pluralism, Profession-
alism and Credibility], Les Cahiers de la Communication, May 2015, pp. 71–79. Available at: http://www.
ministerecommunication.gov.dz/fr/node/1202.
28  These were launched in the context of  a speech by Bouteflika in April 2011 in which he promised 
reforms in response to the wave of  Arab uprisings and street protests in the country. See: ‘Algeria Leader 
Bouteflika Pledges Constitutional Reform’, BBC, 16 April 2011. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-13102157.
29  Hamid Skif, ‘Game of  Hate’, Qantara, 11 December 2009. Available at:  https://en.qantara.de/
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The Ministry of  Communication’s advisor Majid Bakoush explains the ‘special condi-
tions’ that led to the birth of  the private broadcast sector: 
The process could have been more rigorous, but we were going through special 
conditions. Algerians saw their flag being burned; they were insulted by aggres-
sive Egyptian satellite channels, they went crazy. We needed Algerian channels to 
defend us. This was a raison d’Etat.30
The private broadcast sector, born out of  the regime’s ‘special’ vision to serve its needs at the 
international level, largely operates outside international norms and standards. While the 
new TV channels are accused of  fueling sensational populist trends, they enjoy large view-
ership among Algerians, competing with pan-Arab TV channels over national audiences, 
especially in rural areas with higher illiteracy rates. The uncertainty that shapes the condi-
tions of  this sector helps deter dissent among its hundreds of  – mostly young – journalists. 
This private audiovisual landscape is dominated by few TV channels: Ennahar TV, owned 
by former journalist Anis Rahmani, known for his staunch support of  Bouteflika in the 
last presidential elections of  2014, Echourouk TV, owned by former journalist Ali Fadil, 
critical of  the government but hesitant to question the President’s person or policies, and 
KBC TV, owned by the collective of  journalists who launched El Khabar newspaper, con-
sidered relatively critical of  the regime. El Djazairia is owned by businessmen close to the 
regime, and Dzair TV by the prominent businessman of  the building sector, Ali Haddad, 
known as economic baron and close to the President.31 
Tasked with reorganising this chaotic scene, the new regulatory body, ARAV, oversees the 
process of  granting licenses according to the Cahiers de Charges, recently adopted by the 
Ministry of  Communication. Criticised by some journalists interviewed as draconian, 
these new specifications are perceived as an attempt by the regime to completely shut 
the already-narrow window of  tolerance for dissent.32 These Cahiers de Charges ‘proscribe 
any offence, any offensive speech, insulting or defamatory, against the President of  the 
Republic or the institution he represents’. Other articles, more vaguely worded, restrict 
media content criticising ‘national values and state symbols as defined by the Constitu-
tion’ amongst others.33 
Lack of  clarity and consultation threatens to transform the new regulatory body into 
a tool for the Ministry of  Communication to implement its policies. The head of  the 
regulatory body, Zouaoui Benhamadi, refutes these accusations while not denying the lack 
of  clear process and vision: ‘The authority is not a technical instance that will punish the 
media; I am neither a policeman nor an arbitrator. This is a body that has as a mission to 
content/football-war-between-algeria-and-egypt-game-of-hate.
30  Author interview, Algiers (September 2016).
31  George Joffe, ‘Ali Haddad and Algeria’s ‘Economic Barons’’, Al Araby al Jadeed, 27 March 2015. Available at: 
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/politics/2015/3/27/ali-haddad-and-algerias-economic-barons.
32  Author interview with scholar and journalist AbdelKarim Taferguennit, Algiers (September 2016). 
33  ‘Cahier de charges de l’audiovisuel / Des interdits en cascade’, Algerie Focus, 2 July 2016. Available at: http://
www.algerie-focus.com/2016/07/audiovisuel-grands-axes-cahier-charges-regissant-lactivite-devoiles.
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reflect on profound societal matters.’34 
National Media under Attack
Mistrust has always marked the relationship between President Bouteflika and Algerian 
national media, reflected by his reluctance to give interviews, his critical statements towards 
the press, and the 2001 amendment to the penal code which imposed prison sentences for 
defamation against the President. Bouteflika recently slammed online media for ‘allowing 
the dissemination of  slanderous and insulting insinuations’ to the extent of  ‘attacking openly 
and without any scruple, our people and our country’.35 Algeria currently ranks 129 out of 
180 in Reporters Without Borders’ 2016 World Press Freedom Index.36 
Journalists interviewed labelled the frequency of  legal pursuits for defamation against 
them as ‘judicial harassment’, perceived as a tool to drain their financial resources and 
to delegitimise them. Even if  prison sentences are no longer legally imposed for press 
offences, two articles in the Penal Code still prescribe prison sentences for offences against 
high ranking officials, especially the President. Furthermore, frequent legal cases against 
journalists and their institutions based on fiscal or personal affairs are largely viewed as 
politically motivated and aimed at intimidating critical voices. The lack of  independent 
regulation for audiovisual media makes it extremely susceptible to punitive measures – a 
television station operating without a license can be abruptly shut down if  it is considered 
offensive or not in line with the regime’s policies. 
A recent prominent case is that of  freelance journalist and blogger Mohamed Tamalt, who 
died after medical complications as a result of  a hunger strike in protest against his arrest. 
He was convicted of  ‘defaming a public authority’ and ‘offending’ President Bouteflika 
in a poem he posted on Facebook. He used to run a website in which he allegedly posted 
personal allegations against the President, Algerian officials and members of  their fami-
lies. He was sentenced to two years in jail.37
34  Author interview, Algiers (September 2016).
35 ‘Bouteflika s’attaque à la presse électronique’, Kabylie News, 21 October 2016. Available at: http://
kabylie-news.com/algerie/bouteflika-sattaque-a-presse-electronique/; ‘En trompe l’oeil’, Algeria Watch, 
October 2005. Available at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/analyse/benchenouf_presse.htm.
36  See: Reporters Without Borders’ report on Algeria. Available at: https://rsf.org/en/algeria.
37  ‘Affaire de Mohamed Tamalt : la peine de prison confirmée en appel’, Tout sur l’Algerie, 9 August 
2016. Available at: http://www.tsa-algerie.com/20160809/affaire-de-mohamed-tamalt-peine-de-pris-
on-confirmee-appel/.
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Other important cases include the imprisonment of  two television executives of  KBC 
TV in July 2016 for illegal production practices, after the channel aired a satirical show 
including allegations of  corruption against Bouteflika and allusions to the frail health of 
the President, an issue considered extremely sensitive. The programme was immediately 
halted.38 Pressure and intimidation increased during and after the presidential election of 
2014. In March 2014, the private television channel Al Atlas, which adopted an editorial 
line against a fourth presidential mandate for Bouteflika, was ordered to stop broadcast-
ing, accused of  ‘incitement’ and ‘lack of  professionalism’.39 Another private TV channel, 
Al Watan, was closed in October 2015, after airing an interview with a former leader 
of  the Islamic Salvation Army, accused of  ‘offence against symbols of  the state and the 
republic’ according to statements by the Minister of  Communication Hamid Grine.40
Expressing dissent on social media platforms can be punishable under libel laws. A 2009 
cybercrime law gives authorities the right to block websites that are ‘contrary to the public 
order or decency’, and a centralised system monitors internet traffic.41 For instance, activ-
ist Zoulikha Belarbi was convicted of  undermining Bouteflika for posting satirical online 
pictures of  the head of  state on her Facebook page.42
Structures of Domination 
Beyond the legal restrictions on media content, the economic pressures on national media 
were viewed by all interviewees as the most efficient tool for punishing, and thus deterring, 
expression of  dissent. The weakness of  a business model relying heavily on governmental 
subsidies and advertising revenues, alongside the selective legal cases that focus on irregu-
larities in the management of  media organisations expressing dissent, exacerbate both the 
vulnerability of  the national media industry and its volatile conditions. 
A major player in shaping national media is the Agence Nationale d’Edition et de Publicité 
(ANEP).43 This state-owned agency is responsible for distributing and placing public adver-
tisings in all Algerian media, print and audiovisual. For the Ministry of  Communication 
38  ‘Algerian media faces ‘hostile environment’, Al-Jazeera, 15 July 2016. Available at: http://www.alja-
zeera.com/news/2016/07/algerian-media-faces-hostile-environment-160713112312137.html.
39  ‘Algerian TV station shuts after police raid’, Al Jazeera, 12 March 2014. Available at: http://www.alja-
zeera.com/news/africa/2014/03/algerian-tv-station-shuts-after-police-raid-201431213348364242.html
40  ‘Algeria closes TV station over ‘subversive’ interview’, The New Arab, 13 October 2015. Available at: 
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/10/13/algeria-closes-tv-station-over-subversive-interview 
41  Freedom House Algeria country report 2016. 
42 ‘Algerian activist fined for photo shopping Bouteflika’, The New Arab, 22 March 2016. 
Available at: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/blog/2016/3/22/algerian-activist-fined-for-photo-
shopping-bouteflika.
43  Previously, the distribution of  public advertisements was controlled by a special bureau within the 
security services, the so-called Directorate of  Information and Documentation, which was dismantled 
in 2014 alongside Bouteflika’s new policies, which were introduced to weaken the influence of  intelli-
gence services. See: ‘Why Bouteflika dissolved Algeria’s powerful spy agency?’, Al Jazeera, 26 February 
2016. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/02/algeria-dissolved-power-
ful-spy-agency-160225171417842.html
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advisor Majid Bakkoush, the state’s intervention in public advertisements is ‘a way to 
preserve pluralism in the media’ arguing that these revenues are distributed according to 
‘certain requisites’, but giving no further clarification. While there are no clear guidelines 
on how these revenues, crucial for the survival of  media organisations, are dispatched, it is 
a common view among journalists that they are used as a stick and carrot policy to reward 
those loyal to the regime and to punish those critical. 
These revenues also ensure the continuity 
of  small presses with limited distribution 
and a pronounced allegiance to the regime. 
‘The regime intervened in redesigning 
the media landscape by giving funds and 
incentives to the media, press and TV, that 
serve its agenda; these are semi-governmental despite their private ownership, they are 
an extension of  the power in place’, comments Ali Djerri, Chief  Executive of  KBC TV.44 
The financial pressure on national media expressing dissent has lately expanded from 
public to private advertisers, who have allegedly been pressured to withdraw their support 
for independent critical media, such as El Khabar and El Watan, through threats to their 
business interests. 
Asked about these allegations, Bakkoush talks about a so-called ‘circle of  virtue’:
We told advertisers not to link their image and reputation to unethical newspa-
pers. This is not an order but a point of  view. The minister talked about a circle 
of  virtue – good money for good media.45 
State interference in shaping the national media industry takes various forms. When El 
Khabar’s owners attempted to sell the newspaper to the Algerian businessman Issad Rebrab, 
known to be critical to Bouteflika, court verdict supported the government’s claim that 
the deal was in violation of  the country’s anti-monopoly law.46 El Watan newspaper was 
recently prevented from moving offices in Algiers, based on claims it did not have the 
necessary permit for the new premises.47 
‘The fact that we give the opposition a platform is annoying the regime. They know they 
need us, all regimes need a breath of  fresh air, but they need us within certain limits, with-
out expanding and gaining more power and popularity’, comments El Khabar Director 
Kamel Djouzi.48
44  Ibid.
45  Author interview, Algiers (September  2016)
46 ‘Leading Algerian newspaper fighting for its life’, The Arab Weekly, 22 May 2016. Available at: http://
www.thearabweekly.com/News-&-Analysis/5184/Leading-Algerian-newspaper-fighting-for-its-life
47  ‘Algeria: Alarming attacks against independent media’, Article 19, 6 July 2016. Available at: https://
www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38435/en/algeria:-alarming-attacks-against-indepen-
dent-media
48  Author interview, Algiers (September 2016). 
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However, to reduce their dependency on governmental resources, mainly in printing and 
distribution, few media outlets found alternatives. For example, El Watan pioneered an 
independent business model by owning private printing facilities – jointly with El Khabar 
– as well their own mechanisms for distribution and collection of  advertising revenues. 
This independence is however threatened by the decrease in advertising revenues, recent 
competition with TV stations and online news, and the economic crisis in the country as 
a result of  the fall in oil prices. 
Omar Belhouchet, Founder of  El Watan, comments: 
What made the Algerian press different is our ability to resist, due to the legiti-
macy we gained during the war, our readers’ loyalty and our economic model. 
We cannot talk about an autonomous press without an independent functioning 
economic model. This model is still resisting the pressures.49  
The Legacy of the Civil War: The Journalist Soldier
The outbreak of  the Civil War stalled the process of  media reform. It turned journalists 
into targets for attack by Islamic factions on the one hand, and into the conveyers of 
‘patriotic’ journalism in defence of  the state on the other. Although some were sheltered 
in hotels under high security, more than a hundred journalists and media staff  were killed 
and hundreds had to flee during the so-called ‘dark decade’.50 
Imposed in 1992 and only abolished in 2011, the state of  emergency caused serious 
damage to the previously thriving national press.51 The pressure exercised by the intelli-
gence services on media operations, led by the then powerful General Mohamed Mediène, 
nicknamed ‘General Toufik’, was crucial in shaping media content. The eventual repu-
diation of  the powerful general and the instigation of  judicial pursuits against other high 
ranking generals was characterised by the regime as a step towards a civil state, but was 
at the same time criticised as being simply reflective of  the internal struggle between the 
different regime factions, which Bouteflika won.52
During the war, the state imposed rigorous control over the coverage of  violence through 
blanket censorship, the suspension of  newspapers and the arrest and criminal prosecu-
tion of  journalists who attempted independent reporting.53 Diverse narratives on the 
49  Ibid.
50  ‘Journalistes assassinés en Algérie durant les années 90’, Mediapart, 23 November 2012. Available at: 
https://blogs.mediapart.fr/maryam-al-shamiya/blog/231112/journalistes-assassines-en-algerie-du-
rant-les-annees-90
51 ‘Algeria lifts 19-year-old state of  emergency’, Reuters, 24 February 2011. Available at: http://tempsreel.
nouvelobs.com/attentats-terroristes-a-paris/20151119.OBS9845/comment-vivre-avec-l-etat-d-ur-
gence-les-algeriens-conseillent-les-francais.html
52 Richard Nield, ‘Why Bouteflika dissolved Algeria’s powerful spy agency?’, Al Jazeera, 26 February 
2016. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/02/algeria-dissolved-power-
ful-spy-agency-160225171417842.html
53  See the special report by Committee to Protect Journalists, March 1999. Available at: https://www.
cpj.org/attacks98/1998/mideast/AlgeriaSR.html
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conflict were impossible; contradicting official narratives and disseminating unauthorised 
‘pre-mature’ information were treated as offences. Draconian measures were set up, such 
as the notorious ‘reading committees’ established at printing houses to ensure newspapers 
conformed with the official line.54 Kamel Mansari from Le Jeune Independant explains: 
Terrorism destroyed professional traditions; we were in a situation of  war. Some 
of  our work was clearly unprofessional. We were into commentary, even propa-
ganda. We had a different hat on, that of  an activist, a soldier.55
This did not however prevent the development of  resistance amongst journalists. For 
example, El Watan published a report on an operation against the security forces, which 
led to the closure of  the newspaper and the arrest of  the journalists involved. Other 
forms of  resistance included the publishing of  blank pages when the military censor had 
obstructed information, or the publication of  reports containing so-called ‘pre-mature’ 
security information in several presses on the same day, in a strategy aimed to avoid retal-
iation against one specific publication. The proven ability of  the Algerian press to resist 
guardianship is counterbalanced by a lack of  trust due to a perception of  national media 
as an active actor in the struggle, serving as the voice of  the regime – or factions within it 
– by political alignment rather than because of  pressure. The press is yet to address these 
important questions.
Censorship of  security information is no 
longer officially applied, but it is embed-
ded in the practices of  both journalists 
and government officials. Access to infor-
mation on security, but also on other less 
sensitive matters, is presented by most 
journalists as a major challenge. ‘Security 
information was not available during the Civil War and it is still the case today. It is the 
security officer who contacts the journalist and not the other way around. They give us 
the information whenever and however they choose. It is quite impossible to verify it by 
independent sources,’ comments Boualam Guamrassa, a journalist from El Khabar who 
was a field reporter covering the Civil War.56 The head of  KBC TV, Ali Djerri, also stresses 
difficulties faced when trying to access official information: ‘They accuse us of  publishing 
false information when we do our job. I told them our information is accurate as long as 
we don’t have a clarification from a governmental source proving it is wrong. It is very 
difficult to have a comment or response from them on published press reports.’57 
54  These were abolished in 1997.
55  Author interview, Algiers (September 2016)
56  Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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French vs. Arabic: The Identity Divide 
The divide between newspapers in Arabic and French is a reflection of  societal divi-
sions between a French-influenced elite and a rising new middle class attached to Arabic 
and Islamic identities. The French-speaking press is generally perceived as higher quality 
and more secular than the more conservative Arabic-speaking one. The latter claims an 
Arab identity and represents growing societal trends that shy away from French influence, 
investing in populist trends in contrast to the sober Francophone tone. During the Civil 
War, the national press – mostly Francophone – was perceived as supportive of  the radical 
governmental positions against Islamists, to the extent of  paving the way for the military 
coup of  1992 by spreading fear about the future of  the country under Islamic rule. Sensi-
tivities about language and identity are largely viewed as a legacy of  French colonial times 
and post-independence policies.
The recent row surrounding the Ministry of  Education’s reform plan for public schools is 
an example of  the linguistic–ideological divide. Education Minister Nouria Benghabrit’s 
proposal to allow teachers to give dialect lessons in primary school has drawn accusations 
from nationalists and Islamists of  betraying the Algerian identity.58 The publication of 
elementary school level geography books mapping the Middle East and showing Israel 
instead of  Palestine also triggered a row leading to the withdrawal of  the books.59 National 
media reported widely on these divisions.
Hadda Hazem, Editor of  Al Fadjr private publication comments:
They are attacking the minister because she is secular; public schools are under 
the control of  obscurantists. We won the battle against terrorism on the ground 
but they won the social battle. The regime plays all cards, including religion, flirt-
ing with Islamists.60
Conservative trends in Algerian society are solidifying. In September 2016, an Algerian 
Christian convert was sentenced to three years in prison for Facebook posts ‘insulting 
Islam’.61 It is common for Algerians to be jailed or arrested for breaking the fast and ‘vio-
lating the sanctity of  Ramadan’.62 Outspoken journalist and writer Kamel Daoud from 
Le Quotidien d’Oran was issued a fatwa against him calling for his death from a leader of  a 
58  ‘Algeria school language reform hits nationalist raw nerve’, The New Arab, 5 August 2015. Available at: 
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/features/2015/8/5/algeria-school-language-reform-hits-nationalist-
raw-nerve.
59  ‘The Algerian Ministry of  Education is facing widespread criticism because of  Israel’s ethnic divi-
sion’, CNN Arabic, 19 September 2016. Available at: http://arabic.cnn.com/world/2016/09/19/
education-algeria-courses
60  Author interview, Algiers (September 2016).
61  ‘Algeria: 3-Year Sentence for Insulting Islam’, Human Rights Watch, 7 September 2016. Available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/07/algeria-3-year-sentence-insulting-islam.
62  ‘Algerians jailed for breaking Ramadan fast’, Al Arabiya, 7 October 2008. Available at: https://www.
alarabiya.net/articles/2008/10/07/57856.htm; ‘Ramadan in Algeria: The Hefty Sin Tax’, Al Akhbar, 
6 March 2015. Available at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/11246.
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Salafist party. Daoud had expressed controversial ideas in the French media on colonisa-
tion, the Palestinian cause, the Arab Spring and the relationship between Muslims and 
their religion, stating that religion was a problem in the Arab world.63 
New Landscape, Old Practices
While the old generation of  ‘militant journalists’ is still leading the printed press, acting 
as gatekeepers on content, a new generation of  young journalists is the main backbone 
of  the rising private audiovisual sector. The new generation is largely perceived as less 
resilient to directives and red lines compared to their older colleagues, attracted by oppor-
tunities for fame and financial rewards in the private broadcast sector. The old generation 
is perceived as attached to the identity of  the journalist-activist, not able – or not willing 
– to embrace modern trends of  opting for more newsy content away from the political 
editorial. For Mourad Hashid of  El Watan, ‘we are, as independent press, still in our teen-
age years, we are not able to grow into the adult age, to mature.’64 
The newly developed private media pres-
ents a unique landscape. Ennahar media 
group is a good example. Strictly employ-
ing young journalists, even in leading 
editorial positions, the media group enjoys 
high viewing numbers through invest-
ing in everyday news with a pronounced 
populist tone and content. Editor-in-chief, 
Mohamed Bousari, young and with lim-
ited professional experience, explains his eagerness to make sure content is respectful of 
the ‘editorial line’. He says: ‘the editorial line is patriotic, in defence of  the country, our 
foreign policy, issues at stakes, especially security; we avoid all that can be in breach of 
these issues, such as statements or positions that can be considered as threatening the 
stability of  the country.’65 
The sector’s support for the fourth term election of  Bouteflika puts into question its stated 
identity as ‘the voice of  people’.66 Testimonies by young journalists demonstrate their ease 
in navigating between their personal beliefs about professional reporting – including their 
political choices and preferences – and abiding by directives of  editors, the gatekeepers. 
A so-called positivism is embraced by these young journalists – a ‘patriotic’ duty to form 
a bright account of  national controversies. The precarious conditions of  the broadcast 
sector and its hierarchical structure further limit the possible margins for manoeuvre. 
63  ‘Kamel Daoud: A Chronicle of  Controversy’, Fanack Chronicle, 11 February 2015. Available at: 
https://chronicle.fanack.com/algeria/faces/kamel-daoud-chronicle-controversy/.
64  Author interview, Algiers (September 2016). 
65  Ibid.
66  On the dubious standards of  the so-called independent press, see: Djamaldine Benchenouf, ‘La 
liberte de la press en Algerie, en trompe l’oeil’, Algeria-Watch, October 2005. Available at: http://www.
algeria-watch.org/fr/article/analyse/benchenouf_presse.htm.
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Another important factor is the ability of  the regime to co-opt journalists with rewards: 
‘We believe that our main mission should not be to highlight problems, but to provide a 
platform for those who have solutions to these problems. Our role is to appease tensions’, 
comments Hakima Dahabi, a young journalist working for El Mihwar newspaper.67  
For Echourouk TV talk show host Kada Benamar, the ability to raise the ceiling of  debates 
on TV platforms is linked to several reasons, cleverly controlled by the regime. He gave 
the example of  the dismissal of  Algeria’s head of  intelligence in 2015, an unprecedented 
development in terms of  the topics debated on televised platforms: ‘Security changes in 
recent years allowed us to cover topics we would never have dared to tackle before. We 
reported on trials of  generals, talked about corruption, the role of  money in politics, and 
the influence of  generals in choosing presidents. However, this move was allowed and 
encouraged by the regime; the real margin of  manoeuvre is usually the fruit of  friction 
between the regime’s wings.’68
If  self-censorship habits are an everyday reality for journalists in the private sector, with a 
limited margin of  flexibility, this margin does simply not exist for those working in state-
owned broadcast media, a large sector providing more stability but limited freedom. For 
journalists interviewed from this sector, the 
golden word is how to be ‘clever’ in working 
around these restrictions by using ‘ruses’. ‘I 
asked to work on apolitical topics to avoid 
restrictions. Even when I produced reports 
on topics such as the eagerness of  the young 
to immigrate or corruption in schools’ 
canteens, this was considered prohibited 
information’, said a broadcast journalist 
who asked to remain anonymous.69  
The limited margin of  diversity of  views allowed on private televised media platforms, 
depending on the regime’s willingness to open this space or to close it, is creating a façade 
of  media pluralism. ‘No one TV channel can tackle a topic related to the health of  the 
president, or who is really in charge of  the country now; those who dare will be closed. 
There are clear red lines, we know some personalities are above criticism, the president, 
his brother, the head of  the army, these are real taboos’,70 argues Boualam Guemrasa. 
The lack of  professional bodies working in defence of  journalists’ rights and professional 
standards exacerbates the vulnerability of  the national media industry. The formation 
of  the movement of  Algerian journalists (Mouvement des Journalists Algeriens, MJA) in 
1987 played a major role in securing financial and professional gains for journalists. Other 
bodies such as a higher council for information and a council for ethics did not survive the 
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outbreak of  the Civil War. The current syndicate of  journalists is largely viewed as weak 
and lacking in representation, solely representative of  secular French-influenced trends 
within the opposition and national media. This is not denied by the head of  the syndicate, 
Kamal Amarni: ‘We have an identity and we want to protect it. We are modernists, dem-
ocrats, and we have immense differences with Islamic currents that are also represented 
in the press. We are against them.’71
The perceived weakness of  the union has encouraged the formation of  other professional 
bodies for journalists, criticised for attempts to co-opt national media by the regime.72 The 
Press Commission, established by the Ministry of  Communication to register professional 
journalists by issuing cards was boycotted by a part of  the community, which thought it 
was aiming to assert control over the industry.73 
Conclusion
Pressure on Algerian national media has increased in recent years, with heightened social, 
economic and political tensions, and a great level of  intolerance towards critical reporting. 
The latest presidential campaign of  2014 put severe pressure on the media, while simul-
taneously instrumentalising journalists to further political agendas.
‘You – journalists – can write what you want and we – the power – can do what we want.’ 
This is how Algerian journalists understand the freedom of  expression. They understand 
that they have to face retaliation, thus navigate between resistance and co-optation in their 
relation to power. Practices of  resilience and resistance, championed by few independent 
presses pre-Civil War, are challenged by the growing private broadcast sector embedding 
lapdog journalism as an expression of  ‘ethical’ practice, and adopting a ‘national’ role, 
protecting the status quo. Resistance is also set back by a lack of  professional development 
and training for journalists and the impact of  years of  isolation during the Civil War.74 
Red lines – usually the person of  the President and the security institution – are well under-
stood by journalists and reflected in their practices; the relatively high ceiling in the coverage 
of  certain topics is seen as the reflection of  internal struggles between the regime’s wings or 
the regime willingness to open up media platforms to serve its own strategies. Independent 
media is today trapped between several barriers that make its survival quite difficult: shrinking 
71  Ibid.
72  ‘Journalists’ dissentions obstruct their syndicate progress’, Al Jazeera, 22 December 2008. Available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.net/home/Getpage/f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/55ec1c53-8aa0-
42f7-8a76-302ece124e0b; ‘The birth of  the national union for the honour of  the Algerian journalist’, 
Akhbardjalfa.com, 13 February 2016. Available at: http://bit.ly/2lpKYn7.
73  ‘Les enjeux d’une démarche’, Liberte – Algerie. Available at: http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/
les-enjeux-dune-demarche-208479/print/1.
74  On press models and roles, see: Dennis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory (London: Sage, 2000); 
James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power Without Responsibility: The Press, Broadcasting, and New Media in Brit-
ain (London: Routledge, 2003); Nico Carpentier, ‘Coping with the agoraphobia media professional: A 
typology of  journalistic practices reinforcing democracy and participation,’ in Bart Cammaerts and 
Nico Carpentier (eds.), Reclaiming the Media (Bristol, UK: Intellect, 2007).
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advertising revenues, continuous lawsuits, libel cases, fiscal inspections and investigation into 
their management’s irregularities. Excessive state intervention in shaping the media sector and 
its economic prospects pushes independent media towards self-censorship in its quest for sur-
vival. The recent mushrooming of  media projects with sensational trends and a pro-regime 
editorial line is exacerbating the vulnerability of  independent media by further isolating it. 
Media freedom in Algeria is both real and illusionary at once. It exists so long as jour-
nalists have the courage to practice it, to pay the heavy price that comes with it, and to 
renounce the many advantages that can be earned by courting power. It is confined in the 
narrow space between the pressure exercised by the regime (and how ‘creative’ this can 
be), and the cleverness of  the survival tactics used by those who want to resist it.
Earlier Report on Moroccan 
National Media
As part of  the ‘Arab National Media and 
Politics: Democracy Revisited’ project, 
Fatima el-Issawi also wrote a report on 
Moroccan National Media. This examined 
the relationship between Arab traditional 
mass media and the political sphere within 
the remit of  political change in the Arab 
world, enabled by the popular Arab upris-
ings that erupted from 2010 on. Based on 
in-depth field investigation, the report aims 
to analyse the intricate relation between 
the national media and democratisation, 
mapping trends in the national media by 
reflecting on the lived experiences of  jour-
nalists and their perception of  their roles 
and practices. The report looks especially 
at journalists’ approach to entrenched 
taboos and the dynamics of  censorship 
and self-censorship in newsrooms. It is 
based on the outcome of  a series of  qual-
itative interviews conducted in Morocco 
in July 2015 with more than 30 journalists 
and stakeholders in mainstream media, 
both print and audio-visual.
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